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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, forty-two-year-old Christopher Thomas Weaver
pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance.

The district court

imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with one year fixed. The district court also
ordered Mr. Weaver to pay a total amount of $689.63 in restitution, including $300.00 to
the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney, as well as $280.50 in court costs. About
two weeks later, a deputy clerk of the district court filed an Affidavit and Notice of Failure
to Pay, stating that Mr. Weaver had failed to pay the court costs and restitution, and, if
the monies remained unpaid, it would send the unpaid balance to a collection agency
with an additional 33% of the monies owed to be charged as a collection fee.
Mr. Weaver then filed an objection to the order of restitution, which the district court
denied.

On appeal, Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion

when it denied his objection to the order of restitution, because substantial evidence did
not support the amount of restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting
Attorney, and the district court actually had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in
the restitution order.

K•.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The.State charged Mr. Weaver with possession of a controlled substance, felony,
in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1).

(R., pp.5-6, 43-45.)

Mr. Weaver

subsequently entered into a plea agreement, whereby he would plead guilty to
possession of a controlled substance and the parties would stipulate to a unified
sentence of seven years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.46-56.) Mr. Weaver also agreed
to "[p]ay restitution to 'law enforcement agencies' as outlined in I.C. § 37-2732(k) and/or
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§ 18-8003(2)," but the amount of restitution was to be determined by the district court.

(See R., pp.46, 52.) The district court accepted Mr. Weaver's guilty plea. (R., p.58.)
The Twin Falls Prosecuting Attorney's Office then filed, pursuant to I.C. § 372732(k), a Restitution Request asking for a total restitution award of $300.00 for four
hours of "attorney time."

(R., pp.62-64.)

The district court subsequently imposed a

unified sentence of seven years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.65-71.) The district court
also ordered Mr. Weaver to pay a total amount of $689.63 in restitution, as documented
in the "State's Order of Restitution." (R., pp.65, 68.) The restitution order broke down
the total amount to be awarded as follows: $100.00 to the Idaho State Police, $289.63
to the Twin Falls Police Department, and $300.00 to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting
Attorney.

(R., pp.72-74.)

$280.50 in court costs.

Additionally, the district court ordered Mr. Weaver to pay

(R., p.68.) The district court gave Mr. Weaver thirty days to

object to restitution. (R., p.65.)
About two weeks later, a deputy clerk of the district court filed an Affidavit and
Notice of Failure to Pay, stating that Mr. Weaver had failed to pay the court costs and
restitution, for a total balance due of $970.13. (R., p.75.) The affidavit further stated
that "if the monies owed are not paid in full by July 11, 2013 [one month from the date of
the affidavit and notice] pursuant to statute, a collection agency will seek to collect any
unpaid monies and will charge an additional 33% of the money owed as a collection
fee." (R., p.75 (emphases in original).) By the time the affidavit and notice was filed,
Mr. Weaver had been committed to the custody of the Twin Falls County Sheriff for
delivery to the state penitentiary. (See R., p.69.)
Mr. Weaver then filed a timely Objection to Order of Restitution, and requested a
hearing on his objection to the order of restitution. (R., pp.76-79.) At the objection to
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restitution hearing, Mr. Weaver raised two issues: "The first is the time frame to pay ....
And the next is that [Mr. Weaver] wants the prosecutor to account for the four hours that
they have - that they listed that they spent on the
L.25

p.4, L.6.)

in their restitution request." (Tr., p.3,

The State argued that the restitution request was reasonable and

should be upheld. (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-17.) The State left the matter of extending the time
frame to pay in the district court's discretion. (Tr., p.9, Ls.18-23.)
The district court found that the requested restitution amounts for drug testing,
law enforcement time, and prosecutor's time were all reasonable. (Tr., p.10, Ls.13-24,
p.11, Ls.5-8, p.12, L.25 - p.13, L.2) Thus, the district court denied the objection to the
restitution amount for the prosecutor's time. (R., p.95; Tr., p.13, Ls.2-3.) The district
court considered the objection to the time frame to pay restitution as, in effect, a timely
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35") request for leniency, and then denied that Rule 35
motion/objection to timeliness.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.5-7, p.16, Ls.10-16.)

The district court

believed that it was a "statutory obligation" of court clerks collect monies owed to the
courts under the relevant statutes, and the district court did not have the jurisdiction to
stop the clerk from turning unpaid balances over to a collection agency. (Tr., p.14, L.10
- p.16, L.9.) The district court specifically invited Mr. Weaver to file an appeal "because
I'd like an answer out of our supreme court as to whether our analysis is correct .... "
(Tr., p.16, Ls.18-20.)
Mr. Weaver then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's denial of
his objection to the order of restitution. 1 (R., pp.81-85.)

The hearing on the objection to the order of restitution was held on June 21, 2013.
(R., p.80.) The Notice of Appeal was filed on July 24, 2013. (R., p.81.) The written
Order Denying Objection to Restitution Request was filed on August 2, 2013. (R., p.95.)
Thus, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2), the Notice of Appeal matured and
1
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Weaver's objection to the
order of restitution?

became valid upon the filing of the Order Denying Objection to Restitution Request.
See State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287,290 (Ct. App. 1983).
4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Objection To The
Order Of Restitution
A.

Introduction
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

objection to the order of restitution. Substantial evidence did not support the amount of
restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney.2 Further, the district
court actually had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.

B.

Standard Of Review And Relevant Law
"Restitution may be ordered by the district court under I.C. § 37-2732(k) once a

defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under Title 37, Chapter 27 of the
Idaho Code." State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257-58 (2012). Section 37-2732(k) is
applicable to Mr. Weaver because he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).

Pursuant to Section 37-2732(k), "the

court may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in
investigating the violation." I.C. § 37-2732(k). Law enforcement agencies "include ...
the Idaho state police, county and city law enforcement agencies, the office of the
attorney general and city and county prosecuting attorney offices."

Id.

Costs

"include ... those incurred for the purchase of evidence, travel and per diem for law
enforcement officers and witnesses throughout the course of the investigation, hearings
and trials, and any other investigative or prosecution expenses already incurred,
including regular salaries of employees." Id.

2

At the objection to restitution hearing, with respect to the amounts of restitution
awarded, Mr. Weaver only challenged the amount of restitution awarded to the Twin
Falls County Prosecuting Attorney. (See Tr., p.3, L.25 - p.4, L.6.)
5

The Idaho Supreme Court, in a case involving a Section 37-2732(k) restitution
order, stated, "Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short of specific guidance regarding the nature
of a restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an award, we find guidance in the
general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304." Gomez, 153 Idaho at 258. With respect to
restitution ordered pursuant to the general restitution statute, an appellate court "will not
overturn an order of restitution unless an abuse of discretion is shown." State v. Smith,
144 Idaho 687, 692 (Ct. App. 2007).

"When a trial court's discretionary decision is

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. (citing
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Objection
To The Order Of Restitution, Because Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The
Amount Of Restitution Awarded To The Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

objection to the order of restitution, because substantial evidence did not support the
amount of restitution awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney.
The general restitution statute provides that, "Restitution shall be ordered for any
economic loss which the victim actually suffers." I.C. § 19-5304(2).

"Economic loss

shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the
prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator." I.C. § 19-5304(6) (emphasis
added). "Each party shall have the right to present such evidence as may be relevant to
the issue of restitution, and the court may consider such hearsay as may be contained
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in the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise provided to the court."
Id. "The district court's factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on

appeal if supported by substantial evidence."
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885
"Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." Id.
Mr. Weaver submits that substantial evidence did not support the amount
awarded to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney in the district court's Section 372732(k) restitution order.

The prosecutor's time request, while it purported to break

down the requested amount by the time spent on each aspect of the case (see
R., pp.62-63), did not adequately document the time spent. For example, Mr. Weaver

expressly disputed the time claimed by the prosecutor for his first appearance. (Tr., p.4,
L.20 - p.5, L.16;

see

R., p. 62.) At the objection to restitution hearing, Mr. Weaver's

counsel explained that Mr. Weaver was "wondering why, for instance, it takes them 12
minutes to attend his first appearance when his time at the table in his first appearance
was less than 30 seconds." (Tr., p.4, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Weaver's counsel also stated that
"obviously there are some other times, I'm sure, that factor into this, but there's no
explanation as to what those times may be." (Tr., p.5, Ls.5-7.)
Further, at the objection to restitution hearing the State admitted that the
prosecutor's time request was "an estimation," and that, "We don't spend a lot of time
tracking the numbers." (Tr., p.9, Ls.6-8.) The State did not attempt to provide additional
evidence in support of the requested amount, but instead argued that the amount was
"reasonable" because spending more time tracking the numbers "would certainly inflate
the amount of time spent on determining how much restitution would be owed" and add
"additional times ... that we could have that would also inflate that number." (See
7

Tr., p.9, Ls.8-14.)

Based on the time discrepancy for the first appearance, and the

State's own admission that the prosecutor's time request was an estimation, it cannot
be said the prosecutor's time request was supported by any "relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." See Gomez, 153 Idaho at 258.
Thus, substantial evidence did not support the restitution amount awarded to the Twin
Falls County Prosecuting Attorney.
Because substantial evidence did not support the amount of restitution awarded
to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney in the district court's I.C. § 37-2732(k)
restitution order, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Weaver's
objection to the order of restitution.

See Straub, 153 Idaho at 885.

The award of

restitution to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney should be reversed.

D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Weaver's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Request/Objection To Timeliness, Because It Actually Had
Discretion To Extend The Time Frame To Pay In The Restitution Order
Mr. Weaver asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 request/objection to timeliness, because it did not correctly
perceive the issue as one of discretion. Contrary to its belief, the district court actually
had discretion to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.
It appears that I.C. § 37-2732(k) does not contain language specifically governing
the execution or collection of its restitution orders.

Looking to the general restitution

statute for guidance, the statute following I.C. § 19-5304 in the Idaho Code provides
that, "After forty-two (42) days from the entry of the order of restitution or at the
conclusion of a hearing to reconsider an order of restitution, whichever occurs later, and
order of restitution may be recorded as a judgment and the victim may execute as
provided by law for civil judgments." I.C. § 19-5305(1); see also Gomez, 153 Idaho at
8

258 (quoting I.C. § 19-5305 as the statute governing the recording and execution of
restitution orders pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(k)). Additionally, "The clerk of the district
court may take action to collect on the order of restitution on behalf of the victim and,
with the approval of the administrative district judge, may use the procedures set forth in
section 19-4708, Idaho Code, for the collection of the restitution." I. C. § 19-5305(2).
Section 19-4708 provides that, "The supreme court, or the clerks of the district
court with the approval of the administrative district judge, may enter into contracts in
according with this section for collection services for debts owed to courts." I.C. § 194708(1).

"The cost of collection shall be paid by the defendant as an administrative

surcharge when the defendant fails to pay any amount ordered by the court and the
court utilizes the services of a contracting agent pursuant to this section."3 Id.

The

contract with the contracting agent must include a cost of collection fee, which "shall not
exceed thirty-three percent (33%) of the amount collected" and "shall be deducted from
the amount collected but shall not be deducted from the debts owed to courts."
1.C. § 19-4708(4).
Mr. Weaver submits that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
request to extend the time to pay in the restitution order, because the district court did
not recognize its discretion to extend the time to pay. As discussed above, Section 372732(k) provides that if a defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, a crime under
Title 37, Chapter 27 of the Idaho Code, a district court "may order restitution for costs

The statute defines "contracting agent" as "a person, firm or other entity who contracts
to provide collection services, and "cost of collection" as "the fee specified in contracts
to be paid to or retained by a contracting agent for collection services." I.C. § 194708(2)(a) & (b). The definition of "debts owed to courts" includes "court costs,"
"restitution," and "other charges which a court judgment has ordered to be paid to the
court in criminal cases, and which remain unpaid in whole or in part." I.C. § 194708(2)(c).
3
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incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation." I.C. § 37-2732(k).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has observed that "[tJhe word 'may' [in § 37-2732(k)] is
permissive, and it denotes the right to exercise discretion." State v. Mosqueda, 150
Idaho 830, 835 (Ct. App. 2010). In Mosqueda, the Court concluded that, "should a trial
court determine that the connection between the defendant's conviction and the
'investigative costs' sought through the state's restitution request is tenuous or that the
amounts sought are inflated or unreasonably incurred, it possesses the discretion to
deny all or part of the state's restitution request." Id.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Weaver's request to
extent the time frame to pay the restitution order, because it did not correctly perceive
the issue as one of discretion.

Contrary to its belief, the district court actually had

discretion under I.C. § 37-2732(k) to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution
order. Nothing in I.C. §§ 19-5305, 19-4708 or 37-2732(k) specifically prohibits a district
court from extending the time frame to pay in a restitution order. While Mosqueda does
not directly control this issue, it indicates that a district court has broad discretion over
matters involving restitution, including discretion to extend the time to pay in a restitution
order without the defendant incurring a cost of collection fee.

See Mosqueda, 150

Idaho at 835.
Further, district courts have exercised their discretion to extend a defendant's
time to pay restitution and other costs in the context of probation. District courts have
discretion under I. C. § 19-2601 (2) "to order monetary compensation to victims as a
condition of probation."

State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2006); see

State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 279 (1978) ("[T]he payment of court costs and
restitution are also proper and often very useful conditions of withheld judgments and
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probation."). A district court has even "wider discretion" under Section 19-2601 to order
restitution as a condition of probation, as compared with ordering restitution under
Section 19-5304. See Parker, 143 Idaho at 168.
Like I.C. §§ 19-5305, 19-4708 or 37-2732(k), nothing in Section 19-2601(2)
specifically prohibits a district court from extending the time frame to pay restitution or
other costs as a condition of probation.

Thus, district courts have exercised their

discretion to extend a defendant's time to make payments as a condition of probation.
For example, in State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1997), the district court, on a
stipulation of the parties, ordered the defendant to pay restitution in minimum monthly
installments as a condition of the defendant's probation.

Id. at 814.

Similarly, in

State v. Walker, 126 Idaho 508 (Ct. App. 1994), the district court, when it placed the
defendant on supervised probation, ordered the defendant to pay a fine on a ten-month
installment plan.

Id. at 509.

Considering both Section 19-2601 (2) and Sections 19-

5305, 19-4708 and 37-2732 do not specifically prohibit a district court from extending
the time frame to pay restitution, it follows that a district court would also have discretion
to extend a defendant's time to make payments pursuant to a restitution order without
the defendant incurring a cost of collection fee.
Additionally, a district court has greater flexibility when awarding restitution under
I.C. § 37-2732(k), as opposed to awarding restitution under the general restitution
statute, I.C. § 19-5304.

For example, under the general restitution statute a district

court "shall order a defendant ... to make restitution" unless "the court determines that
an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable."
(emphasis added).

I.C. § 19-5304(2)

In contrast, under Section 37-2732(k) a district court is less

restricted, because it "may order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement
11

agencies in investigating the violation." I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis added). Thus, even
if a district court would not have discretion to extend the time to pay in a Section 195304 restitution order, this greater flexibility gives a district court discretion to extend the
time to pay in a Section 37-2732(k) restitution order to allow a defendant more time to
pay without incurring a cost of collection fee.
In light of the above considerations, the district court here actually had discretion
under I.C. § 37-2732(k) to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order. Thus,
the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Weaver's Idaho Criminal Rule
35 request/objection to timeliness, because it did not correctly perceive the issue as one
of discretion. The order of restitution should be vacated with respect to the time frame
to pay, and the case remanded to the district court for the district court to consider
whether to extend the time frame to pay in the restitution order.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Weaver respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the district court's award of restitution to the Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney,
vacate the order of restitution with respect to the time frame to pay, and remand his
case to the district court with instructions to consider whether to extend the time frame
to pay in the restitution order.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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